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BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY: 
 
THE SUPPORTING ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Based on interviews in LEO Pharma, UCB Pharma and Novo Nordisk, we document how 
deep-seated changes in the pharmaceutical industry related to increasing demands from payers, 
the strengthening of the role of patients, changing legal demands, and declining technological 
opportunity, drive a process of experimenting with business model.  We distinguish between 
three ideal types, namely a traditionalist model (exemplified by Novo Nordisk), the full-blown 
service-oriented model (UCB Pharma) and the in-between model (LEO Pharma). We describe 
the changes to the organizational design and management processes that accompany the 
ongoing process of changing business models in these firms.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The pharmaceutical industry assumes a major economic role in a number of countries (e.g., US, 
Germany, and Denmark) in terms of its share of overall value-added, R&D inputs, exports, and 
innovativeness. The industry also captures general interest because of its role as the key originator of 
medical innovation in the world, and has, partly for this reason, for a long time been heavily 
regulated. It has captured scholarly interest because of, for example, the highly “closed” innovation 
model, pricing policies, and dynamics of the boundaries of the firm that have characterized this 
industry (e.g., Bianchi, Cavaliere, Chiaroni, Frattini, & Chiesa, 2011; Danzon, 2006; Pisano, 1991). 
Thus, the last decades have witnessed major merger and acquisition activity, and a substantial 
alliance activity, for example, with biotechnology firms. Much of this activity may be seen as 
attempts to patch a business model—namely, the “blockbuster model” based on high-volume, high-
margin sales of drugs for common conditions and driven by mainly internal and very substantial 
R&D inputs, as well as scale economies in R&D, production, marketing and sales (Gilbert, Henske, 
& Singh, 2003)—that, some argue, is “becoming extinct” (Mattke, Klautzer, & Mengistu, 2012, p. 
1). This prediction is based on an argument that technological opportunities in the pharmaceutical 
industry are declining, development costs are soaring, copy products are proliferating, and regulatory 
pressures are building-up that threaten margins.  
The strength and relative weight of these ongoing changes are subject to substantial debate. 
However, that changes in the industry are quite real is not open to dispute.  We argue that these 
changes, some of which are external to the industry (e.g., regulatory pressure) and some internal 
(e.g., competitive dynamics involving copy products), drive the ongoing experimentation with 
business models that can be observed in the industry. Much of this experimentation takes the form of 
introducing the service dimension as an integral part of the emerging business models, a dynamic 
that has been building up over the last decade.  
Business models are often taken to denote the firm’s core logic for creating and capturing 
value by specifying the firm’s fundamental value proposition(s), the markets and market segments it 
addresses, the structure of the value chain which is required for realizing the relevant value 
proposition, and the mechanisms of value capture that the firm deploys. We describe the 
reconfigurations of three companies, partly relying on the framework of Santos et al. (this volume).  
We show how these reconfigurations are embedded in, and related to changes in, organizational 
designs. Indeed, the managerial challenges of business model innovation are to a large extent 
organizational challenges that involve the redesign of organizational structure and control, as well as 
choices that involve the boundaries of pharmaceutical firms vis-á-vis other firms.  We describe 
various changes in the organizational design of three select players in the industry, discuss how these 
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are related to the deep-seated changes the industry is witnessing, and discuss the managerial 
challenges of implementing organizational designs that fit the emerging business models in the 
industry, particularly those that shift the value-proposition towards a service-based one.  
 We begin by briefly discussing our data sources and the method of diverse cases; move on to a 
presentation of the industry context; then turn to the drivers that prompt the ongoing experimentation 
with business models in the industry; discuss the forms that the actual experimentation takes; and end 
by discussing the challenges of choosing organizational design that can embed the changing business 
models faced by pharmaceutical firms.  
DATA AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Small-N Research Designs 
In the following we adopt a small-N research design to explore the organizational challenges 
that companies in the pharmaceutical industry face when seeking to innovate their business models. 
Such designs are often criticized on the ground that they are vulnerable to selection bias, and, hence, 
problems of external validity (Bryman, 1988; King, 1994). However, most scholars agree that when 
there are fundamental gaps in the understanding of a phenomenon concerning which variables matter 
and how, explorative research based on small-N samples is warranted (Eisenhardt, 1989; Westney & 
Van Maanen, 2011). Moreover, as Dyer and Wilkins (1991: 617) explain, “if executed well, case 
studies can be “extremely powerful” when “authors have described general phenomenon so well that 
others have little difficulty seeing the same phenomenon in their own experience and research.” 
Thus, “good stories” are successful in terms of identifying generative mechanisms that other 
researchers can recognize in the cases they investigate ( edstr m, 2005).  This study is basically an 
attempt to identify the operation of such mechanisms in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. 
We specifically draw on a diverse-case method of selection with the primary objective of 
achieving maximum variation along relevant dimensions (while homogenizing other dimensions). In 
line with the diverse-case approach, the selection of specific pharmaceutical companies was based on 
the study’s aims, that is, seeking a balanced sample of companies in which issues and processes 
related to the organizational dimensions of business model innovation can be compared, while at the 
same time keeping variability reasonably high. We selected the following three companies for the 
sample, namely Novo Nordisk A/S, which pursues a “traditionalist” strategy; LEO Pharma A/S, 
which pursues a “simultaneous” approach, explicitly balancing different business models; and UCB 
Pharma, which is transitioning towards a service-oriented model. Our interviews and general 
industry knowledge indicates that these three firms can be taken to be representative of different 
kinds of experimentation with business models in the pharmaceutical industry.  
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In contrast to a purely inductive study, the present research is informed by a priori theory on 
organizational design and organization/environment relations (e.g., Thompson, 1967). We approach 
the pharmaceutical industry armed with theory, because this “increases requisite variety … it takes a 
complicated sensing device to register a complicated set of events” (Weick, 2007, p. 16). The 
relevant theories help to organize data collection and interpretation, and metaphorically serve as a 
dialogue partner for the data.  
Data Collection and Analysis  
 The data for this study was collected from three overlapping sources, namely in-depth, semi-
structured interviews, documents, and observation studies. These sources were triangulated to 
maintain the integrity of the analysis (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Silverman, 2006). We relied on 
Lincoln and Guba's (1985) guidelines for “purposeful sampling” and initially interviewed top 
managers about how they change the organizational design of their firms in order to facilitate and 
encourage business model innovation. Next a “snowball” technique was adopted, asking each top 
manager for his or her recommendations as to who could best explain the processes of interests. Prior 
research (see e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Isabella, 1990) and the study’s research objective, suggested 
that sampling should begin with top managers because they typically play a key role in ventures that 
represent new strategic directions and resource configurations for the firm. As active participants in 
championing a new business model, these managers represent key informants (Kumar, Stern, & 
Anderson, 1993) who have overall insight into the company’s core capabilities, organizational 
structures, resource allocation, strategies etc., and are therefore in a unique position to recommend 
additional key and role informants at all levels within the organization.  
 In total, 30 in-depth interviews were carried out.
1
 All interviews started with open questions 
about the company’s overall strategy and recent experience. As the interviews progressed, the 
questions gradually became more structured, delving into organizational design issues in the relevant 
firms, and the specific challenges they faced on the organizational side with respect to business 
model innovation. In addition, non-participant observations were made by one of the authors of the 
chapter, who, in the interest of full-disclosure, is working as an industrial PhD researcher in one of 
the interviewed companies (i.e., LEO Pharma). Finally, we examined relevant documents, such as 
internal powerpoint presentations , annual company reports, and consulting reports. The documents 
not only supplied additional information, but also allowed us to control for memory bias by 
                                                          
1 Specifically, the interviews were distributed as follows over the three firm: UCB Pharma: 15 interviews in total, ranging 
from Executive Vice President to Manager level; LEO Pharma A/S: 13 interviews in total, ranging from Executive Vice 
President to Manager level; Novo Nordisk A/S: 2 interviews in total, ranging from Corporate Vice President to Manager 
level.   
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comparing interview statements with the collected document data (Miller, Cardinal, & Glick, 1997). 
Our discussion of the drivers of business model innovation in the industry is mainly based on 
documents. 
 To analyze the data, we adopted Yin's (2003) “pattern-matching” method of analysis. In this 
approach the empirical patterns of the case (and the embedded cases) are compared with those of 
theory. To emerge at patterns interviews were transcribed. Following triangulation with documents, 
this procedure allowed for the derivation across the interviews of patterns relating to how the 
relevant firms were changing their organization to facilitate business model innovation. In order to 
further strengthen validity, respondent validation was also applied (Silverman, 2006).   
DRIVERS OF BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION  
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
The extant literature does not point to any unique drivers of business model innovation (or, business 
model “learning”, “evolution”, “modification”, “reconfiguration” or “renewal”; cf. Demil & Lecocq, 
2010; Doz & Kosonen, 2010; Dunford, Palmer, & Benveniste, 2010; Teece, 2010). Rather, it 
generically points to forces such as globalization, deregulation, technological advances, and 
changing preferences as drivers (idem.). Clearly, the ensemble of forces that drive business model 
innovation differs across industries. In the context of the pharmaceutical industry, we argue that the 
particularly important drivers are mounting payer pressures, regulatory changes, and, more 
controversially, declining technological opportunity. 
The Payment Challenge 
What is referred to by industry insiders as the “payment challenge” refers to a host of structural 
changes in the costs of health care and the willingness and ability of governments and insurance 
companies to pay for treatments that jointly put margins in the industry under strong pressure, a 
tendency that has been exacerbated by the emphasis on fiscal austerity since the onset of the financial 
crisis of 2008.  Data from OECD (2010) suggest that health care spending per capita in OECD 
countries has risen by over 70% in real terms since the early 1990s. This increased spending can be 
partly attributed to deep-seated demographic, epidemiological, and economic changes. By 2020, 
there will be more than 7.6 billion people in the world, with 719 million (9.4%) being over 65—the 
segment of the population that consumes most medicine per capita. Furthermore, the size of this 
segment will double relative to its size in the year of 2000 (Hunter, 2013). In the developed 
countries, life expectancy has increased by, on average 2 years for every decade since the early 
1990s. However, Hunter (2013:1818) noted, this “has not been matched by a concomitant increase in 
health, leading to an actual increase in the economic burden.”  
6 
 
WHO (2002) found that if chronic conditions are not adequately prevented and/or managed, 
they may become the most expensive problems faced by health care systems. Current health care 
systems are mainly designed to treat acute problems related to illnesses (i.e., diagnosing, testing, 
relieving symptoms, and developing cure). While these tasks are important for acute and episodic 
health problems, a remarkable discrepancy emerges when adopting this model for the management 
of chronic conditions. Substantial evidence suggests that patients with chronic conditions are usually 
undertreated in emerging countries due to limited access to medicine (WHO, 2003), while in 
developed countries the problem is that they do not comply to prescribed treatment regimens 
(Wagner et al., 2011). In particular, medical non-compliance has been identified as a major issue of 
public health which in turn imposes a considerable financial burden upon modern health care 
systems (Donovan, 1995; Weinman & Petrie, 1997). WHO studies show that 50% of people with a 
chronic condition are non-compliant (WHO, 2003). This has been estimated to cost $177 billion 
annually in the USA (approximately a quarter of total annual pharmaceutical revenues) (IMS, 2008) 
and account for 78% of health care spending (Bodenheimer & Fernandez, 2005). For patients, non-
compliance is directly related to poorer health outcomes (Loden & Schooler, 2000) and increased 
health care costs (Kane & Shaya, 2008).   
 Against this backdrop, pharmaceutical companies face surging demands from payers, who, in 
their efforts to control soaring health care costs, are increasingly requiring that pharmaceutical 
companies demonstrate that their products provide therapeutic or cost advantages over competitors’ 
products and non-pharmaceutical treatment options.  
Regulatory change 
 Changes in the regulatory environment have also led to the introduction of additional 
demanding hurdles that a new drug must clear prior to market launch. Following the well-publicized 
market withdrawals of high-profile pharmaceutical products such as rofecoxib (Vioxx, Merck), 
cerivastatin (Baycol, Bayer), troglitazone (Rezulin, Warner-Lambert) and cisapride (Propulsid, 
Janssen Pharmaceutica), the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and its counterparts in other 
major markets have put more focus on preapproval safety evaluations and increased their reliance on 
postapproval systems to monitor product safety and use (Munos, 2009). For example, with the 
ratification of the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 20072 in the US, the FDA was 
granted new authority to require submission of risk evaluation, mitigation strategies and application 
for regulatory approval, to demand postmarket clinical studies on approved products if safety issues 
arise. Under such circumstances, they would be able to mandate changes to a drug’s approved 
                                                          
2 FDA Amendments Act. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823. 
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labeling, and to impose new distribution and use restrictions on marketed drugs (Kaitin, 2010). 
Globally, regulators also collaborate more closely, so when a product is rejected in one market it is 
more likely to be rejected in others. In 2010, for instance, EMA pulled the diabetes drug Avandia, 
while the FDA imposed severe restrictions on its use, and the two agencies exchanged notes before 
reaching a final decision.3     
Declining Technological Opportunity in the Pharmaceutical Industry 
 In spite of steadily increasing levels of investments in R&D over the past two decades, the 
pharmaceutical industry has not been able to avoid a continuous decline in the number of new 
molecular entities (NMEs) that enter clinical development and subsequent market entry (Light & 
Lexchin, 2012). To illustrate, in 2002 the FDA only approved seventeen NMEs for sale in the US, 
that is, only a small fraction of the fifteen-year high of fifty-six approved NMEs in 1996 and the 
lowest since 1983 (Cockburn, 2004). The US is by no means alone. Thus, worldwide statistics 
suggest that the annual number of new active substances approved in major markets declined by fifty 
during the 1990s, while private-sector R&D expenditures tripled.4 These numbers have prompted 
concerns from industry leaders, observers, and policy makers, with some declaring an innovation 
crisis within pharmaceutical research.  
 Some scholars argue that these concerns are almost surely exaggerated: The so-called 
innovation crisis rests on the decline in NMEs, since the sharp peak in 1996 that resulted from the 
rapid backlog reduction of applications after the FDA deployed the augmented staff hired under the 
Prescription Drug User Fee Act of 1992 to reduce approval times (Scherer, 2007). This decline ended 
in 2006, when approvals of NMEs reverted to their long term mean of between 15 and 25 a year.5 On 
the basis of FDA records, Munos (2009) showed that pharmaceutical companies “… have delivered 
innovation at a constant rate for almost 60 years,” and new biologicals6 have followed a similar 
pattern “in which approvals fluctuate around a constant, low level.” According to Hopkins, Martin, 
                                                          
3 Sten Stovall, ”Europe’s Drug Regulator Says Innovation Must Pick Up” , The Wall Street Journal (15 December 2010). 
4 EFPIA member companies spent $47 billion in 2002. European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries and 
Associations, “The pharmaceutical industry in figures, 2003 update (Brussels: EFPIA, 2003).  
5  US Food and Drug Administration. New molecular entity approvals for 2010. Silver Spring: FDA, 2011. 
www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/howdrugsaredevelopedandapproved/drugandbiologicapprov
alreports/UCM242695.pdf. 
6 A “biologic” is manufactured in a living system such as a microorganism, or plant or animal cells. Most biologics are 
very large, complex molecules or mixtures of molecules. Many biologics are produced using recombinant DNA 
technology. A drug is typically manufactured through chemical synthesis, which means that it is made by combining 
specific chemical ingredients in an ordered process. http://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ 
accessed: 16-12-2013.  
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Nightingale, Kraft, and Mahdi (2007), not even the revolution of biotechnology changed the rate of 
approval of NMEs, though it influenced strategies for drug development.7  
 Thus, whether there is a crisis or not is a much more complex question than the absolute 
number of NMEs brought to market. More importantly is the number of NMEs that represent an 
actual therapeutic advance. Although innovation is often measured in terms of NMEs as a stand-in 
for therapeutically superior new medicines by the industry and its analysts, most have only provided 
trivial clinical advantages over existing treatments (Light & Lexchin, 2012). This is not a new 
phenomenon, the dominance of drugs without major therapeutic gains can be traced back to the 
“golden age” of pharmaceutical innovation. Covering the period from 1974 to 1994, the industry’s 
Barral report on all internationally marketed NMEs concluded that only 11% were therapeutically 
and pharmacologically innovative (Barral, 1996). Since the mid-1990s independent reviews have 
reached roughly the same conclusion that approximately 85-90% of NMEs provide minor or no 
clinical advantages for patients (see e.g., Angell, 2005; Luijn, Gribnau, & Leufkens, 2010).                     
Empowering End Users and Health Care Professionals 
 Historically, patients have played an essentially passive role in health delivery. In most 
cultures, the physician has been the sole decision-maker with regard to diagnosis and the most 
optimal treatment regimen; after all, they have had much more training and medical knowledge than 
patients. Further, in markets where patients have enjoyed health insurance, insurers have not only 
insulated patients from financial shocks but also from the prices of various treatments which are 
essential for creating optimal resource allocation in efficient markets. Patients have followed 
obligingly, while experts have made decisions that could, quite literally, have life-or-death 
consequences for them.  
 Prompted by the recent advances in internet and communication technologies (ICTs), 
transparency is expected to increase, in turn likely empowering patients and changing the practice of 
health care into a patient-centric model with patients having more “on demand” access to 
information. Social media networks—from PatientsLikeMe to Sermo and Medscape Physician 
Connect—are making data on outcomes and efficacy more transparent and freeing it from the control 
of corporate giants. New mobile technologies and apps enable patients to take a more active role in 
managing their own health care. For example, in diabetes, where effective disease management 
requires a coordinated and holistic approach, new apps assist patients in not only managing their 
                                                          
7
 Such accounts obviously raise the issue of why there has been an escalating discussion of declining technological 
opportunities and a crisis to medical innovation. Adamini, Maarse, Versluis, and Light (2009) suggest that telling stories 
about the “innovation crisis” to politicians and the press is a rent-seeking plot: It helps to attract a range of government 
protections from the “generic” competition. 
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blood glucose but also other aspects of their health, such as diet and exercise.8 The range of apps is 
by no means limited to diabetes.  For example , these include apps that aid patients in keeping track 
of vaccination schedules (i.e., Novartis’ VaxTrak), control their hemophilia A Factor VIII infusions 
(i.e., Bayer’s Factor Track), and map cancer clinical trials within 150 miles (i.e., GSK’s Cancer 
Trials).  
 With the new ICTs, health care professionals can potentially access patient records from any 
given location. For example, physicians’ access to patient history file, newest pharmaceutical data, 
laboratory results, insurance information and medical resources would be more effectively used by 
ICTs, and in turn, improving the quality of patient care (Istepanian, Jovanov, & Zhang, 2004). 
Further, the amount of data that can be mined from such systems can be used to compare efficacy 
between different treatments. Kaiser Healthcare and Intermountain Health, have already been doing 
this for a while, and new entrants in the personal health record (PHR) business such as Google 
 ealth and Microsoft  ealthVault could take “value mining” to an entirely new level. These trends 
are likely to result in more empowered and better informed patients, which in turn means that 
physicians spend less time in explaining rudimentary facts about diseases, and rather set aside time to 
discuss more complex treatment aspects and listen to each patient.
9
  
BUSINESS MODELS CHANGES IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
Dynamics of Business Models 
 Established pharmaceutical companies have reacted to the above drivers in terms of more or 
less radically changes to their basic value propositions, the organization of their value chains, 
internal organization, key resources, and revenue models. Santos, Spector and Van der Heyden (this 
volume) explain how firms can reconfigure their existing business models by either (1) 
“reactivating,” that is, altering the set of elemental activities that the firm offers to its customers (e.g. 
offering a hot meal on flights); (2) “repartitioning,” that is, altering the boundaries of the firm by 
moving activities and the organizational units that perform activities (e.g. outsourcing); (3) 
“relocating,” that is, altering the (physical, cultural and institutional) location of units currently 
                                                          
8 Abott recently launched a German language IPhone app, DiabetesMapp, which allows patients to locate specialists 
nearby to manage a diverse range of diabetes-specific conditions, including diabetologists, psychotherapists, podiatrists, 
diabetes disease groups and more. 
9
  Kaplan, Greenfield, Gandek, Rogers, and Ware (1996) found that patients that engaged with the physician in a 
“participatory decision-making style” had improved health outcomes and were more satisfied. The study also showed 
that physicians with this kind of decision-making style were 30% less likely to have patient defection. In a different study 
based on patients with hypertension and breast cancer, they found that communication between patients and physicians 
affected the health status of patients. Notably, consultations where patients had engaged in prior information gathering, 
more information sharing between the patient and the physician, and more expression of emotion were all related to 
improved health outcomes (Kaplan et al., 1996).       
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performing activities (e.g. offshoring); and (4) “relinking,” that is, altering the linkages between the 
organizational units that perform these activities (e.g., an arms-length relation with a supplier 
becomes an alliance). This classification provides a highly convenient way to think about business 
model innovation, as such innovations may be understood as more or less radical changes in 
elements (1) to (4), either in only one of them (modular business model innovation) or in most or all 
of them (architectural business model innovation) (cf. Foss & Stieglitz, this volume). We rely on the 
Santos et al. classification in the following. 
 The pharmaceutical industry demonstrates various ongoing adjustments of or experimenting 
with existing business model ranging from changes that only involve one of the above 
reconfigurations, for example, an increase in the number of alliances with biotechnology firms (i.e., 
(2) above), to more radical changes that involve most of the above reconfigurations and which are 
clearly in the nature of distinct business model innovation. The data suggests a meaningful 
distinction between an incremental “traditionalist approach” (here exemplified by Novo Nordisk 
A/S), a full-blown “service-oriented approach” (UCB Pharma), and the in-between “simultaneous 
approach” (LEO Pharma A/S).  We acknowledge that this taxonomy is neither fully exhaustive (there 
may be other business model and associated business model innovations), nor fully exclusive (the 
three business models may be partly overlapping for certain companies). Indeed, one of them, 
namely the simultaneous arguably represents a transitional form. Nevertheless, the three approaches 
represent useful ideal types that adequately represent many of the important players.  
The Traditionalist Approach: Leveraging Extant Capabilities  
 Companies that pursue this model are not necessarily traditionalists in the sense that they stick 
to the block buster model. Rather, they are traditionalist in the sense that they seek to leverage all of 
the traditional capabilities of pharmaceutical companies to a more or less incremental change of the 
basic business proposition. Thus, some traditionalists leverage existing capabilities in the context of 
“targeted medicine,” that is, targeting drugs towards well-defined populations where 
”pharmacogenomics” suggests that the relevant drugs have maximum beneficial impact. Most 
traditionalists continue the classic ”one size fits all” approach, that is, the target drugs to a mass 
market rather than a smaller target population. Many traditionalists are changing firm boundaries, 
both upstream and downstream. Thus, they are engage in partnerships across the entire life cycle of a 
drug, from precompetitive collaboration related to elucidating targets all the way to 
commercialization. They build more and deeper ties to universities to identify new treatments. Such 
a strategy may be complemented by buying smaller innovative firms and/or engaging in licensing 
agreements in order to get the production of the relevant drug in-house.   
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 This incremental approach to business model innovation may be exemplified by the case of 
Novo Nordisk A/S (Novo Nordisk). The origins of Novo Nordisk started with the two small Danish 
companies Nordisk Insulinlaboratorium and Novo Terapeutisk Laboratorium, founded in 1923 and 
1925, respectively. Today, Novo Nordisk is global health care company with nearly a century of 
innovation and leadership in diabetes care; it also has strong positions within haemophilia care, 
growth hormone therapy and hormone replacement therapy. The company is headquartered in 
Denmark, employs approximately 36,300 employees in 75 countries, and markets its products in 
more than 180 countries. In the following we briefly describe recent changes to the Novo Nordisk 
business model, relying on the Santos et al. (this volume) classification of business model changes.  
 Reactivating. In 2007, Novo Nordisk discontinued its small molecule business to focus on 
biopharmaceutical research and its protein-based pharmaceuticals. “Our core competences lie within 
therapeutic proteins, and it is within this area we can make the greatest difference in terms of patient 
outcomes and company growth,” said Mads Krogsgaard Thomsen, Chief Science Officer of Novo 
Nordisk. In 2011, Novo Nordisk has launched a bottom-of-the-pyramid (Prahalad, 2006) business 
model in Kenya, a country in which 250,000 people are in need of insulin, but where 80,000 of those 
in need have an annual income of only between 1,500 and 3,000 US dollars. To make insulin more 
affordable and accessible to this segment, the new model has lowered price-markups in the supply 
chain to the extent that insulin can be obtained at 20 cents daily, equivalent to a third of the previous 
price.10   
  Relinking. The DAWN
TM
 study was initiated by Novo Nordisk in a partnership with the 
International Diabetes Federation and an international advisory panel of leading diabetes experts and 
patient advocates in 2001. The study was undertaken in response to the fact that despite the 
availability of effective therapies, less than half of individuals with diabetes were achieving adequate 
glycaemic control. The partnering organizations and experts recognized that new global as well as 
national knowledge was direly needed. This required taking a 360 degrees view, to explore the 
barriers inhibiting more effective delivery of diabetes care and continuous support to those in need. 
During that time there were no equivalent global studies, stressing the importance of non-medical 
attitudinal and psychological aspects of diabetes management in multiple countries.         
 Relocating. As a part of Novo Nordisk’s R&D internationalization strategy, the company 
established a R&D centre in Beijing as a wholly-owned subsidiary in 2001. They considered the 
                                                          
10
 Like many other pharmaceutical companies, Novo Nordisk is offering a patient support program, though only in its US 
market. Their so-called Cornerstone4care™ patient assistance program is specifically targeted at patients that have 
household income below the federal poverty level. 
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centre to be a bridge between the scientific communities in Europe and China, and being located in 
the Chinese market solidified an important milestone for their future competitive position. Another 
reason was to provide support to existing activities, and to ensure the goodwill of the Chinese 
government in the future (Boel, 2007).     
The Service Oriented Business Model  
 The full-blown service-based business model involves several radical reconfigurations relative 
to the traditional pharmaceutical business model. Companies that belong to this category aim at 
expanding the value proposition offered to customers by providing, notably, patient support services. 
To implement the new value proposition(s), new business models are developed which include the 
identification and development of new capabilities and/or redeployment of capabilities in new ways. 
In addition, these companies also look for new external partners that can help generate new ideas and 
facilitate access to the end-users.     
Union Chimique Belge (UCB) illustrates these reconfigurations. UCB was founded in 1928 
and headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, UCB is a patient-centric global biopharmaceutical leader 
(notably in epilepsy) focusing on severe diseases in two therapeutic areas, namely central nervous 
system and immunology.11 Here are the main elements of the company’s reconfigurations towards a 
patient-centric business model: 
 Reactivating. In recent years, UCB has added a range of different (online and offline-based) 
patient support programmes (e.g. Crohn’s and MeTM, Parkinson’s Well-being MapTM, etc.) to assist 
patients understand their condition better, and guide them to better cope and manage their disease. As 
the Head of HR in Europe explains: “Typically physicians are only looking at the physical symptoms 
related to a disease. For example, in epilepsy, physicians are primarily concerned with the number of 
seizures per week. But the patient demands more; s/he is not just seizure machine—s/he is a human 
being. So together with patients we developed an online multi-dimensional well-being map 
addressing concerns such as quality of life, stigma and sexual activity—things that physicians tend to 
neglect.” It should also be mentioned that all the patient support programmes are provided for free 
with equal access to any patient.  
 Relinking. Over the past five years, UCB has increasingly been active in seeking new 
partnerships with various stakeholders in the industry, notably with health care payers. Recently, 
NICE reversed a previous decision and has accepted certolizumab pegol (Cimizia®) for the 
treatment of Rheumatoid Arthritis after UCB offered a risk-sharing agreement with the Department 
of Health in the UK. Specifically, UCB agreed to provide the first 12 weeks of Cimizia® (10 pre-
                                                          
11 The company had revenues of € 3.4 billion in 2012, operations in approximately 40 countries worldwide, 9,000 
employees, and is listed on the Euronext Brussels Stock Exchange. 
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loaded 200-mg syringes) free of charge to all patients beginning treatment. Initially, Cimizia® did 
not receive a positive reimbursement because it was determined that it did not achieve a significant 
degree of cost-effectiveness. Even more radically, UCB has initiated partnerships with non-
traditional stakeholders such as IBM and PatientsLikeMe.   
 Repartitioning. Traditionally, UCB’s market research was primarily performed in-house. 
However, the ability to get access and collect information and data about patients plays an 
increasingly important role: First, it is instrumental to develop and deliver patient-centered solutions; 
and second, payers are increasingly demanding patient-reported outcomes during their 
reimbursement.  owever, as explained by the Vice President &  ead of Europe  R: “While data-
mining is clearly important, it is not really within our core competencies, companies such as IBM 
and PatientsLikeMe are better suited for that tasks which is why we have partnered with them. 
Rather, based on our strong disease understanding it is up to us make sense of all the data and 
subsequently convert it into solutions for patients.”      
The Simultaneous Approach: Ambidextrous Business Model Innovation 
This approach constitutes a middle ground between the two extremes (i.e. the traditionalist and 
the full-blown service model). Companies pursuing the simultaneous approach maintain their 
incumbent business model, while at the same time pursuing business model innovation, a kind of 
“ambidextrous” approach (Markides, 2013). From a managerial perspective this involves the 
challenge that adding a new business model necessitates different and potentially incompatible 
value-chain activities and supporting organizational designs from the ones that the company has in 
place for its incumbent model.  LEO Pharma A/S (LEO) illustrates the simultaneous approach.  
LEO is a stand-alone, research-based pharmaceutical company founded in 1908 in Denmark. 
The firm develops, manufactures and markets pharmaceutical drugs to dermatologic and thrombotic 
patients in more than 100 countries globally.
12
 In late 2011, LEO began development of its first truly 
patient support service, namely QualityCare
TM
. In 2012, COLUMBUS was launched as a company-
wide project explicitly aimed at business model experimentation; 29 pilot projects (“pilots”) were set 
up in a number of subsidiaries.  
Reactivating. In 2013, LEO became a service provider by adding QualityCare
TM
 (an online 
platform) to its incumbent business model. Currently, QualityCare
TM
 consists of two global 
frameworks, one for psoriasis and one for actinic keratosis. Through the combination of a 
customized web page, SMS’s, emails and nurse calls, patients enrolling into QualityCareTM receive 
                                                          
12 LEO Pharma has its own sales forces in 59 countries and employs more than 3,900 employees worldwide, with an 
annual turnover of approximately 1,072billion Euro. The company headquarters are in Denmark. The company is wholly 
owned by the private and independent LEO Foundation. 
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information and support about their condition. The aim is to improve the overall treatment outcomes 
by improving the experience patients receive. One of the COLUMBUS pilots also intends to improve 
customer experience by providing a direct-to-patient delivery model. Through an alliance with the 
Dutch Thuis Apoteek, LEO products are delivered to directly to patients’ households, who, in turn 
experience greater convenience. 
Relinking. Although LEO had an in-house Digital department, they used market transactions 
with respect to QualityCare
TM
. First, LEO lacked the technical capabilities to develop such a 
platform. Second, due to legal ramifications, LEO had to have a third-party vendor that could collect 
and store the individual patient data. For that reason, LEO initiated a long-term partnership with 
Vertic, a strategic digital agency specialized in advanced digital solutions, in 2011. 
Repartitioning. While in the past, most strategic thinking with respect to innovation occurred 
in LEO’s headquarter, COLUMBUS is an attempt to move innovation closer to the market. Hence, 
each pilot is led by a business model innovation or patient engagement manager from the respective 
subsidiary or region rather than someone from headquarter. Relatedly, to co-develop with patients, 
LEO initiated the “Psoriasis Frontiers” project in collaboration with the National Psoriasis 
Foundation (patient organization) in the US. In particular, a survey is distributed to the members of 
the patient organization and based on the survey responses LEO select participants for a full-day 
workshop. The aim is to identify specific lead users (i.e. creative individuals with strong needs). 
During the workshop, LEO provides the lead users with an opportunity to express their ideas and 
concerns related to their life as a psoriatic patient. These workshops have already been fruitful. 
Following the first three workshops, two concrete projects have started in new product development 
based on user-generated ideas.         
ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES OF BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION 
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
While there is a general understanding among business model scholars that business models need to 
be aligned with the firm’s overall corporate strategy (Casadesus-Masanell & Ricart, 2010), little 
research has investigated how firms can realign their existing organizational design to facilitate 
business model innovation and what are the organizational design ramifications of such innovation. 
We argue that the changing business models in the pharmaceutical industry call for important 
changes in the organizational design of these firms. Traditionally, firms in the pharmaceutical 
industry have been organized along strict functional lines, so that each stage in the value chain from 
initial idea conception to eventual (and much later) marketing of a drug is associated with a distinct 
organizational unit. This is an organizational design that is geared to facilitate an emphasis on scale 
and throughput in the production of products. However, changing value propositions towards a 
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higher service-content and restructuring value chains towards more partnerships with external parties 
call for different, typically more project-based organizations with new roles, task structures, KPIs 
and so on. Overall, the changing business models in the industry call for organizational structures 
that lie closer to the matrix form than to the functional form.  
Internal Organization  
 One of the few contributions to the literature that explicitly link business model innovation and 
organizational design is O'Reilly and Tushman (2004). They argue that firms tend to structure BMI 
in one of four basic ways, depending on how radical the BMI is: (1) In the functional design 
structure, BMI activities are completely integrated into the regular organizational and management 
structure; (2) the cross-functional tea, still operates within the established organization but outside 
the existing management hierarchy; (3) the unsupported team is a new unit set up outside the 
established organization and management hierarchy; and (4) in ambidextrous organizations efforts 
are organized as structurally independent units, each having its own processes, structures and 
cultures yet integrated into the existing top management hierarchy.     
In general, all three companies have moved away from purely functionally oriented structures 
towards more project-based organizations. UCB’s introduction of its “patient solution teams”— 
called so to stress that the aim is to provide solutions that go beyond the drug— provides an example.  
Being team-based, the new organization facilitates the speeding bringing-together and integration of 
different bodies of knowledge (in particularly, UCB wanted to promote integration of marketing and 
R&D) so that complex patient needs can be addressed in potentially novel ways. The solution teams 
were headed by a Vice President and allowed to self-organize. As a result, twelve autonomous units 
were set up, each with their own processes to fulfill their new patient missions—resembling the 
organizational flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit embodied in the design of the ambidextrous 
organization  
Novo Nordisk also seeks a stronger alignment of R&D with marketing. However, the internal 
organization differs in several respects from the ambidextrous organization of UCB. Novo Nordisk is 
more focused on exploiting its existing capabilities in developing and commercializing new drugs, 
rather than developing new services that address more diverse patient needs. This is in line with the 
traditional value proposition, and for that reason the functional design structure suffices for Novo 
Nordisk. That is, when new projects are initiated, they often go through the same sequence of stages 
and are assessed using existing criteria. Although employees may work cross-functionally in such 
projects, they do so only for a limited period and they still have to carry out their given functional 
tasks. Overall, Novo Nordisk’s approach to its business model is one that emphasizes changing the 
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model in a highly incremental manner by fine-tuning existing elements of the model and the 
underlying activities, such as sales, market access, disease understanding and life-cycle management.  
In contrast, LEO has yet to implement a formal organization that exhibits an integrated 
approach to drug development, but a version of Cooper's (1990)  stage-gate model is currently being 
developed to mitigate this issue (interview with Director of Scientific Affairs, LEO). Much like 
UCB, LEO strives to be a solution provider with products and services co-developed and fitted 
individually for customers. A new department, Global Patient Engagement (GPE), supports this 
strategic reorientation. GPE is tasked with extending the incumbent business model to include a 
service dimension, and in general act as an active and credible integrator of business model 
innovation activities across the organization. To some extent, this resonates with the unsupported 
team structure in the sense that GPE performs a range of new value chain activities (e.g., the 
development and implementation of an Internet-based patient support service) that lie outside the 
scope of the established organization. In addition, because of its explorative purpose, GPE has more 
autonomy than existing departments.  Of the three cases we studied for the research in this chapter, 
LEO is the only company that has a dedicated department with an explicit focus on business model 
innovation. A reason may be that LEO’s incumbent model is less successful relative to the other 
companies in terms of profitability, hence the more explicit focus on business model innovation.         
Changing Task Environments: Coordination Requirements and Resource Needs 
 Business model innovation usually involves addressing new task environments. Turbulent 
environments tend to force companies to make substantial changes to their internal task structures 
(Tushman, 1979) . Nevertheless, despite the significant changes in the industry, Novo Nordisk has 
only made minor changes (e.g. the greater integration between R&D and marketing) to their internal 
task structure (relative to LEO and UCB). Indeed, because Novo Nordisk fundamentally sticks to its 
existing business model, its activities involve routine tasks that are managed through supervisory 
control, reliance on formalization, and centralized communication as opposed to UCB’s autonomous 
patient solution teams.  Rather, Novo Nordisk augments its business model by strengthening the 
company’s already strong capabilities within their key functional areas.  
 LEO’s decision to extend its current value proposition to also include services has resulted in a 
range of non-routine tasks. For example, the development and subsequent launch of QualityCare
TM 
in 
the subsidiaries
 
were not a routine task. Explains the Director of Global Patient Engagement: 
“Initially, we very much influenced and limited by our  product-centric routines and constantly 
insisted on applying the same strict processes, principles and tactics that pharmaceuticals go 
through.” In addition, initially QualityCareTM was not included in LEO’s short-and mid-term 
business plans, which made it difficult to get the proper prioritization and resource commitments 
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from the subsidiaries. As a senior manager in Global Patient Engagement explained: “Basically, 
some [subsidiaries] did not make any kind of market preparation prior to launch, in a sense, they 
expected that corporate would just implement the service.” As this suggests, the simultaneous 
approach to BMI in LEO has given rise to substantial coordination issues.  
  Although UCB’s incumbent business model had been quite successful in recent years, top 
management felt that UCB should be more proactive to changes in the external environment; hence, 
the introduction of the patient solution team structure. An interesting aspect of this structure is that an 
explicit logic of complementarity was present in the development of the teams. As a Senior Vice 
President noted: “Market access will play a pivotal role due to the health transaction technology 
assessments. Companies need to get ready for innovation—not only from product and regulatory 
approval perspective but also how they get their products reimbursed.” This implied that over the 
course of six months a significant part of the organization was structured around twelve patient 
solution teams that consisted of people from the most crucial functions such as market, access, R&D, 
regulatory affairs etc. in an attempt—to ultimately speed the time to market and (perhaps more 
importantly) address emerging needs from patients, payers and physicians. Overall, even though this 
was a radically different way of structuring (e.g. new tasks, reporting lines, goals and relations 
among people)—UCB was able to limit coordination costs by “getting the complementarities right.”  
Changing Human Capital Portfolios  
Business model innovation often entails building new assets or combining existing one in new 
ways. This may involve specific investments and individual and organizational learning processes.
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It may also entail building new human resource portfolios by means of hiring and training.                         
   LEO is actively looking for new employee-based competences:  “To prepare for the more 
systemic nature of the industry, we search for individuals with hybrid profiles—preferably with 
knowledge in science, strategy, economics and marketing as well as experience from the fast-
moving-consumer industry and services” (Senior Director in Leo). Furthermore, the establishment of 
GPE has created two new types of job positions, namely, the roles of business model innovation and 
patient engagement manager. Initially, these positions were only found in GPE, but lately there has 
been a steadily increase in patient engagement and business model innovation managers at the 
regional and subsidiary level.  
                                                          
13
 As Winter (2000: 984) states: “… to create a significant new capability, an organization must typically make a set of 
specific and highly complementary investments in tangible assets, in process development, and in the establishment of 
relationships that cross the boundaries of the organizational unit in which the process is deemed to reside.”  
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 Similarly to LEO, UCB is looking for generalists with capabilities of working cross-
functionally and with a taste for the web, social media and customer relationship management, 
because of the importance of this to connecting to patients. Further, devices and diagnostic play an 
integral part in UCB’s mission to become a patient solution provider; hence people with skills in 
these areas are also desired. Perhaps more importantly, UCB is aggressively recruiting for candidates 
that are savvy in the payer negotiation dimension (interview with the UCB Vice President & HR of 
Europe). 
 Novo Nordisk, (perhaps to a larger degree) has taken several steps to upgrade their human 
capital, including the so-called STAR and graduate programmes. The former is targeted at PhDs and 
PostDocs, whereas the latter is intended for master students. Both programmes are very structured 
and designed to provide talents with firm-specific competencies.   
 Market access was highlighted several times during the interviews. In contrast, to the other 
marketing functions, market access functions are typically staffed with several people holding PhD 
degrees or equivalent qualifications. As argued by Eichler et al. (2010), while getting regulatory 
approval is still important, it is of little use to industry and patients when a drug is not reimbursed, 
since access to high-priced drugs will likely be precluded for most patients.   
 Organizational Practices 
Business model innovation usually involves bringing new tasks inside the company, raising 
new coordination requirements that in turn demand new organizational practices that can address 
these requirements. UCB has made significant changes to their underlying organizational practices. 
Thus, decision rights have been delegated to the Vice Presidents, allowing them to create their own 
teams (by pulling in people from across the organization) and pursuing projects without interference 
from the executive committee. This reallocation of decision rights was explicitly to address the new 
challenge of creating and delivering patient-centered solutions, namely to move decisions to where 
the relevant knowledge and information reside (interview with Senior Vice President and President 
of Europe region, UCB). 
However, to further strengthen the new value proposition and structure, UCB introduced a set 
of other complementing practices. First, the ability to source and process relevant patient data and 
then convert it into an insight (i.e., useful and meaningful piece of digested information) that can be 
incorporated into new services, products and activities required that UCB increased their internal 
communication (particularly along the lateral dimension) by installing Lync (an instant messaging 
service) and recently UCB Plaza (a new intranet platform). Second, to compensate for the lack of 
human capital that can work with patient solutions in a cross-domain context, the HR department 
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conducts regular organizational reviews. Based on that, they rotate talents to other positions within 
the company, where they can have a more significant business impact. 
 In contrast, LEO has made less of an emphasis with respect to developing and diffusing 
organizational practices that reflect its new strategic orientation and underlying structure. Similarly, 
to UCB’s Plaza, LEO has introduced an intranet-platform (“Pulse”) with the aim of improving 
internal knowledge sharing that, however, has proven difficult. In particular, because LEO has yet to 
develop a culture that leverages intranet communication software. Rather, knowledge sharing is 
primarily sought by means of informal communication and meetings.. As an additional knowledge 
sharing practice, LEO’s GPE have arranged a range of global workshops for employees involved in 
BMI. These have been quite useful in exploiting synergies among the business model pilots. In 
addition, recently GPE introduced the concept of “Elite project” to refine some of the more 
promising business model pilots and in general speed up the pilot phase. Such projects received their 
own coach from top management and were entitled to longer visits from GPE (wherein expert 
knowledge about BMI reside). In conjunction with the launch of QualityCare
TM
, GPE developed a 
launch excellence tool for the subsidiaries—reflecting the (generic) steps and challenges associated 
with the implementation of an Internet-based platform. 
Not surprisingly, Novo Nordisk has not introduced any new organizational practice to 
accommodate business model innovation, since the company refines rather than innovates its existing 
business model. Novo Nordisk probably has the most strongly institutionalized practices, as reflected 
in the codification of these practice in the so-called “Novo Nordisk Way,” that is, ten statements 
describing the core practices of Novo Nordisk.14 To ensure the widespread use and adherence to 
these guiding practices, Novo Nordisk conducts so-called “value audits.” Senior employees are 
selected as “facilitators” and they travel the organization to interview employees, managers and 
internal stakeholders of the units, looking into documents and local business practices. Based on that, 
an assessment is conducted assessing the degree to which the unit operated its business in accordance 
with “Novo Nordisk Way,” areas for improvement are highlighted, and best practices that can 
potentially be shared across the organization are identified (interview with Corporate vice president, 
Novo Nordisk).           
Performance Measurement Systems 
                                                          
14 The ten Novo Nordisk commandments are as follows: “1) We create value by having a patient centred business 
approach 2) We set ambitious goals and strive for excellence 3) We are accountable for our financial, environmental and 
social performance 4) We provide information to the benefit of our stakeholders 6) We treat everyone with respect 7) We 
focus on personal performance development 8) We have healthy and engaging working environment 9) We optimize the 
way we work and strive for simplicity 10) We never compromise on quality and business ethics”;  see 
http://www.novonordisk.com/about_us/novo_nordisk_way/nnway_essentials.asp; accessed: 27-11-2013.   
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The implementation of a BMI requires alignment between organizational elements. 
Performance measurement systems play a pivotal role in this regard because they help to formulate, 
communicate and implement BMI across the organization. Specifically, they are used to control and 
influence behavior in the organization and guide the strategic reorientation process (Wouters, 2009).  
Overall, none of the companies seem to have completely abandoned the performance management 
systems traditionally associated with pharmaceutical companies. Hence, measurement related to, for 
example, sales, time to market and physician visits are still prevalent in each company. Since the 
majority of revenues still come from traditional drug sales, this is hardly surprising. Nevertheless, 
LEO has incorporated a few new key performance indicators (KPIs) into their existing systems. 
These are used to keep project leaders accountable. For example, GPE tracks the stages of all 
business model pilots including the number of pilots in preparation, progress, on hold/discontinued 
and implemented into daily business. Furthermore, the QualityCare
TM
 platform has a number of 
inbuilt KPIs, such as customer satisfaction linked to the various services it provides and number of 
enrolled patient. In addition, the platform also tracks the quality of life through the dermatology life 
quality index (DLQI).15 Finally, GPE also measure the number of failed business model pilots versus 
successful pilots and the diffusion of successful pilots to other subsidiaries.    
Novo Nordisk has recently defined new strategic company goals that stress the importance of 
new markets (especially developing countries). To support the emerging bottom of the pyramid 
strategy two new indicators measure (1) the number of least developed countries where Novo 
Nordisk operates, and (2) the number of least developed countries which have chosen to buy insulin 
under the best possible pricing scheme. Whereas the former is a proxy of access to essential 
medicines, the latter addresses the affordability of essential medicines. A number of indicators have 
also been set up to emphasize the importance of the “Novo Nordisk Way.” The first measures the 
average of respondents’ answers as to whether social and environmental issues are important for the 
future of the company. A second measure captures the average of respondents’ answers as to whether 
their manager’s behavior is consistent with Novo Nordisk values. A third one measures the 
percentage of fulfillment of action points planned arising from “Value audits” of the “Novo Nordisk 
Way” of management and values.  
In contrast to LEO and Novo Nordisk, top management in UCB is more skeptical about 
furnishing their new internal organization with a range of new KPIs. As a Senior Vice President 
expressed: “During the inception of the patient solution teams, we discussed the appropriateness of 
                                                          
15    The DLQI was developed in 1994 and it was the first dermatology-specific quality of life instrument. It is a simple 
10-question validated questionnaire that has been used in over 40 different skin conditions in over 80 countries and is 
available in over 90 languages. http://www.dermatology.org.uk/quality/dlqi/quality-dlqi.html accessed: 27-11-2013.  
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new KPIs. However, the conclusion was that KPIs tend to become a tick box exercise without adding 
much value.” Relatedly, it would not make sense to impose very rigid KPIs, as they would possibly 
interfere with the autonomous nature of the teams. Rather, teams that actually succeed in fulfilling a 
specific patient mission through the process of translating patient insights into a final solution are 
considered to be a proper indication of solid performance (Interview with Vice President and HR of 
Europe, UCB). Nevertheless, to ensure that resources were congruent with the new business model, 
subsidiaries had to submit regularly reports about their budget allocation. The target explicitly stated 
that at least 30% of the budget must be allocated to non-traditional marketing activities.  
Drivers and Facilitators of Organizational Changes  
There is general agreement among scholars and practitioners that change processes are 
complex and challenging for organization engaged in such initiatives. Change drivers, including 
culture, vision, leadership and communication have been argued to facilitate organizational change 
process (e.g., Whelan-Berry, Gordon, & Hinings, 2003). In all three companies, several of the key 
informants noted that the external environment had changed substantially in the past decade and, as 
such, partly explains the surge in BMI activity. Similarly, leadership and notably the appointment of 
a new CEO appeared to prompt organizational change in all three cases.   
Novo Nordisk was one of the first companies in the industry to address patient-centricity.  
Following his appointment as CEO of Novo Nordisk in 2000, Lars Rebien initiated a number of 
important changes.
16
 Traditionally, the physician had been the customer, but Novo Nordisk decided 
that the user of their products should be the primary customer. A program was initiated that it made it 
mandatory for all Novo employees to meet a diabetic patient. In 2007, Novo Nordisk discontinued its 
small molecule business in an effort to focus on biopharmaceutical research and its protein-based 
pharmaceuticals. “Our core competences lie within therapeutic proteins, and it is within this area we 
can make the greatest difference in terms of patient outcomes and company growth,” said Mads 
Krogsgaard Thomsen, Chief Scientific Officer of Novo Nordisk.  
In 2003, Roch Doliveux joined UCB and was appointed CEO in 2005. This initiated a period 
of many, far-reaching change initiatives. Like Lars Rebien, Roch Doliveux was also a strong believer 
in patient-centricity. As noted by the Vice President of New Patient Solutions and Alliance and 
Portfolio Management, UCB: “Roch was the first person to start bringing patients to our 
management meetings.” A new vision was conceived, making patient centricity center stage. In 
2006, UCB turned into a biopharmaceutical company by acquiring Schwarz Pharma, the largest 
acquisition in UCB’s history. In 2009, UCB made 2,400 positions redundant—almost 20% of its 
                                                          
16 Prior to his appointment, he had led the divestment of Novo Nordisk’s enzyme business (today Novozymes A/S).   
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total workforce. This was the so-called SHAPE project, intended to focus on its core assets (notably 
within Central Nervous System), redeploy resources, advance R&D and simplify its organization. In 
2010, UCB replaced ONE UCB with SHARED UCB, an initiative aimed at changing the identity of 
the company, promoting values such as diversity, connectivity and co-creation.  
In 2011, senior management assembled the “New Journey board”, consisting of the eight most 
talented individuals from across the organization. Their role was two-fold: first, they had a year to 
explore the dynamics of the industry and how it may look like in 2020, and more importantly, what 
are the implications for UCB. Second, they served as change agents promoting the new values. These 
initiatives were part of a greater plan, namely to prepare the company for a fundamental structural 
change, which was the birth of the patient solution teams in 2012. As the Vice President and HR of 
Europe, UCB argued: “It is likely that sub-cultures will emerge in very autonomous units such as the 
patient solution teams, which in turn may stifle knowledge sharing among them. We believed that 
these initiatives would be able to counterbalance some of the issues derived from such a new 
structure.” 
In 2008, Gitte Pugholm Aabo took over as CEO in LEO. A new vision was enacted to focus 
efforts on dermatology. This was followed by a new growth strategy, called “Going for Gold.” This 
implied change for the hitherto conservative company. In 2009, LEO acquired Peplin inc for 287,5 
million US dollars. Although this was a small acquisition relative other acquisitions in the industry, it 
was the largest in company history. “Going for Gold” followed the bandwagon by stating that LEO 
should become a patient centric company. To implement that change, the “Growing LEO leaders 
program” was launched in late 2011, aimed at infusing 450 leaders with new values and concepts 
(e.g. agile, active learning and business models) to help reshaping the organizational culture into a 
truly global, patient-centric enterprise. Shortly after, GPE was created with the purpose of 
developing new patient support services and provide the ground for BMI. 
While all three companies seem to adopt similar change drivers (e.g. leadership, vision and 
culture) in their efforts to prompt and facilitate changes or adjustments of their business models, the 
nature and number of facilitators differ widely. For example, while some of Novo Nordisk and 
UCB’s initiatives (e.g. “The Novo Nordisk Way” and “Shared UCB”) have been implemented across 
the whole organization, LEO’s leadership program was solely directed at 450 individuals. Perhaps 
not surprising given the subsequent changes to UCB’s internal organization, UCB has adopted more 
facilitating drivers relative to the other companies.           
Lack of Fit in the Changing Business Models in the Pharmaceutical Industry? 
As is evident from the previous sections, a number of different change facilitators (ranging 
from new structures to new organizational identity) have been implemented to support the various 
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types of BMI. However, as Zenger ( 2002, p. 80)  notes, managers often “…overlay new measures 
on existing, functionally-oriented structures; they implement new structures without new 
performance measures and without new pay systems; they implement new pay systems, but fail to 
restructure or develop new performance measures.” 
Although UCB made the most fundamental changes to its business model and underlying 
organization, they were not able to achieve perfect internal fit among choices with respect to 
activities, organization structure and practices. As the Vice President and HR of Europe, UCB notes: 
“Typically we experience an after chock after such a fundamental change; some people does not fit 
the new model; others are not happy with their new tasks and responsibilities; and some of the 
interfaces are not perfectly aligned. Nevertheless, when we change things in UCB we do it fast. The 
price we pay for that is that we do not achieve perfection the first time.” For example, the increased 
delegation in the patient solution teams was not accompanied with new incentives or performance 
measures to reflect the peculiarities of their new tasks. 
Similarly, LEO experienced a number of internal fit inconsistencies. Although there has been a 
surge in the number of BMI managers, these managers has a dual role in the sense that they still have 
to carry out activities associated with the incumbent model; and since they are still formally held 
accountable for short-term sales targets, some of them tend to down-prioritize their business model 
pilots. This issue is further exacerbated by the fact that, while COLUMBUS is regarded as a key 
priority, it has yet to be incorporated into the company’s annual business plan (interview with Senior 
Business Model Innovation Manager, GPE). Similarly to UCB, LEO has not made any efforts to 
change its current incentive system. “I strongly believe incentives could play an important role in 
changing certain behaviors in the organization. However, it is a very delicate matter and should be 
used with caution”, said the Director of GPE, LEO. In contrast to UCB and Novo Nordisk, most of 
LEO’s BMI facilitators are not formalized or institutionalized across the organization, implying that 
some subsidiaries put more effort and resources into BMI than others. Not surprisingly, these are 
typically the ones that have most informal interaction with GPE. Relatedly, a recent survey among 
employees affiliated with COLUMBUS showed that BMI has not been sufficiently implemented in 
LEO.  
Given Novo Nordisk’s more incremental approach to BMI, they have not suffered the same 
degree of internal inconsistencies compared to LEO and UCB. Although changes have been made to 
its incumbent model, these have not significantly violated the internal fit among existing activities, 
policies, capabilities etc. Rather, these changes aimed at creating a tighter fit to further exploit the 
success of its incumbent model. However, once Novo Nordisk’s incumbent model starts negating 
value it might be increasingly difficult to facilitate change due to the tight coupling. As Levinthal 
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(1997, p. 936)  asserts: “Firms may have a difficulty navigating a changing environment not only 
because the changes in the environment negate the value of the organization’s assets, but also 
because a tightly coupled organization may have difficulty adapting to such changes.”          
CONCLUSION 
We have argued that a number of deep-seated drivers rooted mainly in internationalization, 
regulatory forces, payer pressure, increased competition from generics producers, and changing 
technological opportunities are shaking up the pharmaceutical industry, a tendency that has been 
visible for more than a decade (cf. Gilbert, Henske & Singh, 2003). The result is a decline in the 
importance of the traditional blockbuster business model, and an ongoing quest to discover the new 
profitable model(s).  
This chapter has identified three ideal types that exhibit different degrees of business model 
innovation, primarily with respect to changing value propositions towards a higher service-content 
and restructuring value chains towards new activities and external partnerships. This was done in an 
attempt to examine the organizational design choices accompanied by such models as well as some 
of the liabilities of such choices. In particular, the focus has been on changes in the internal 
organization and its underlying task structure. A main finding was the move towards organizational 
structures that lie closer to the matrix form than to the functional form. UCB’s “patient solution 
teams” was the most extreme case—providing the organizational flexibility and entrepreneurial spirit 
embodied in the design of the ambidextrous organization. In contrast, Novo Nordisk is more 
concerned with exploiting existing capabilities to drive the traditional value proposition, and for that 
reason relies on the functional design structure. In between, we find LEO who has dedicated a new 
department (GPE) tasked with increasing the service-content and experiment with new business 
models—resembling the unsupported team structure in the sense that GPE performs a range of new 
value chain activities in parallel with the existing business.  
The call for new structures was partly driven by the changing task environment, particularly in 
the cases of LEO and UCB which expanded their value propositions towards services. The 
development and launch of LEO’s patient support service QualityCareTM involved a number of non-
routine tasks, which gave rise to coordination issues between the new value chain activities and the 
existing product-centric routines. UCB was able to mitigate these issues by swiftly structuring a 
significant part of the organization around the “patient solution teams” and thereby limiting 
coordination costs by “getting the complementarities right.” Unlike the other companies, Novo 
Nordisk did not encounter any notable coordination issues because they fundamentally stick to their 
incumbent business model. 
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Relatedly, the different types of business model innovation and their accompanying 
organizational structures were followed by adjustment and/or renewal in other areas. A recurring 
theme was need for new human capital to either augment the incumbent model or drive more radical 
business model experimentation. To address the new non-routine tasks a number of organizational 
practices were installed (such as reallocation of decision rights, lateral communication, workshops) 
to ease the new coordination requirements. Similarly, new performance measurement systems and 
KPIs were also set up to support the firms’ (though to varying degrees) new strategic reorientations. 
A number of drivers prompted the desire or need for change and facilitated the subsequent 
implementation of the firms’ new business models. In particular, the appointment of a new CEO 
appeared to spark organizational change in all three cases. This was followed by new visions and 
strategies in the companies to drive the change. Perhaps more importantly, a range of different 
initiatives (e.g., “Shared UCB,” “The Novo Nordisk Way” and “Growing LEO Leaders”) were 
initiated in the three firms to implement change across the organization (though to a larger degree in 
UCB and Novo Nordisk). Of the three companies, UCB adopted more facilitating drivers than the 
other companies, which is not surprising given the fundamental change to its internal organization. 
The three ideal types also gave rise to an increasing misfit between the traditional organization 
and the emerging organization dictated by the new models. Another main finding was the problem 
with internal fit inconsistencies, namely that managers overlay or introduce new practices and 
measures (in parallel with) on existing, functionally-oriented structures (cf. Zenger, 2002). This was 
evident in all three cases, though to a much lesser degree in Novo Nordisk. For example, while UCB 
made the most far-reaching changes to its business model and organization, they more or less kept 
the traditional incentives and performance measures intact—not reflecting the peculiarities of their 
new service-based model. Selecting a new business model is complex already, but when one 
considers all the elements of organization required to implement a new model, the problem becomes 
mindboggling complicated. However, if pharmaceutical companies are to succeed in innovating their 
incumbent models (especially in cases of radical change), the organizational context should be 
changed respectively in accordance with the new business model in order to realize 
complementarities and limit coordination costs. 
Despite, the smallness of our sample, we believe that the three ideal types are, at least to some 
extent, generalizable to other pharmaceutical companies. Companies such as Janssen 
Pharmaceuticals, Eli Lilly, Abbott, Pfizer and many more have expanded their value propositions to 
include different patient support services. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) restructured its R&D 
administrative system by the introduction of Centers of Excellence in Drug Discovery (CEDD). 
Similarly to UCB’s patient solution teams, “each CEDD had its own leader and management team, 
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and possessed most of the functions required to move a molecule from discovery to proof of 
concept” (Pisano, 2012: 6). Several companies (e.g. Sanofi, GSK and Pfizer) are also exploiting 
existing capabilities with respect to rare diseases. Because these so-called orphan drugs tend to enjoy 
premium prices, reduced marketing costs, increased reimbursement, longer exclusivity, small clinical 
trials and fast track approval procedures.       
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